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Abstract 
 
The objective of this paper is to explore the extent to which the more recent literature on 
innovation and diffusion, with a prime focus on technical innovations, can contribute to a 
useful analytical framework for studying the diffusion of organisational innovations. We 
review that literature, compare the intrinsic features of technical and organisational 
innovations and explore what these differences may mean for an eventual analytical 
framework specifically developed for studying organisational innovations. We conclude that 
the received ‘innovation’ literature has a great deal to offer but that some modifications are 
required. In particular, we suggest that the role of factors ‘ïnside’ of the firm and of non-
market mechanisms for transfer of organisational innovations need special emphasis. 
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Introduction 
 
Any observer of industrial dynamics1 would be inclined to suggest that organisational 
innovations2 3 have a profound impact on productivity and competitive advantage, 
user-supplier relations, the content of work etc. However, it still appears as if there is 
little systematic knowledge available about the determinants of the diffusion of 
organisational innovations and, indeed, about their effects.4 Edquist underlines this 
weakness:  
 
'In this field our knowledge is much more scattered and the field is characterized by 
conceptual vagueness and unclarity...we have very little systematic empirical 
knowledge about the creation and diffusion of new organisational forms; it is a blank 
spot on the research map.' 5 
 
The purpose of this paper is to explore the extent to which the more recent literature 
on innovation and diffusion which focus on technical innovations6, can contribute to a 
useful analytical framework for studying the diffusion of organisational innovations. 
 
The paper is, thus, exploratory and should be read in that way. It is set up as follows. 
Section two reviews some salient features of the innovation and diffusion process. We 
emphasize the local, cumulative and path-dependent nature of technological change. 
Section three compares technical and organisational innovations with respect to their 
intrinsic features and explore the implications these may have on the market for 
organisational innovations. The search and implementation processes of 
organisational and technical innovations are also contrasted. We find that although 
organisational and technical innovations share a set of characteristics, they also differ 
in some important respects. In particular, we suggest that the market for 
organisational innovations is relatively poorly functioning and that the local nature of 
the search process is even more accentuated. Section four discusses what implications 
these differences may have for analyzing the diffusion process of organisational 
innovations. We believe that much care has to be taken to define the object of study 
and that the ‘inside’ of the firm is particularly critical to understand when analysing 
the diffusion of organisational innovations. Moreover, we suggest that the transfer and 
implementation costs may be high and that the issue of standardization is central to 
the diffusion process. Finally, we argue that there are reasons to expect long diffusion 
periods and that non-market mechanisms for the transfer of organisational innovations 
are of considerable importance to the diffusion process. Section five pulls together the 
main conclusions. 
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The Nature of the Innovation and Diffusion Process 
 
The purpose of this section is to briefly review some of the more recent work on 
economics of innovation and diffusion. We will proceed by identifying a set of 
characteristics of the innovation and diffusion process. 
 
 
a)     It is cumulative and path-dependent 
 
Technological change can be seen as a learning process which is mainly gradual and 
cumulative in character.7 A relatively ordered pattern of innovations can be observed 
along what Dosi labels technological trajectories.8 Learning and technological change 
at the level of the firm is also cumulative. Firms build upon their existing knowledge 
base and other assets when they search for new opportunities. As Dosi puts it: 
 
'... the search process of industrial firms to improve their technology is not likely to be 
one where they survey the whole stock of knowledge before making their technical 
choices. Given its highly differentiated nature, firms will instead seek to improve and 
to diversify their technology by searching in zones that enable them to use and to 
build upon their existing technological base. In other words, technological and 
organisational changes in each firm are cumulative processes too. What the firm can 
hope to do technologically in the future is heavily constrained by what it has been 
capable of doing in the past'.9 (our emphasis) 
 
Learning and technological change is therefore rooted in the present economic 
structure. In other words, it is path-dependent10 and largely11 local in nature. 
 
Since learning is cumulative, the learning performance is presumably greatest when 
the object of learning is related to what is already known. This implies that it would 
be useful to understand how a new technology is related to the existing technology 
base. Granstrand & Jacobsson12 suggest that the technological 'distance' could, in 
principle, be measured. For instance, intuitively, one would believe that the 
knowledge base of software design overlaps more with that of servo systems than 
with solid mechanics.13  
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b)     The tacit nature of knowledge and the importance of networks14 
 
Technological knowledge is to a varying degree tacit in nature. In each technology, 
there are elements which are tacit (person-embodied) and can therefore not be 
diffused easily.15 As this tacit component in the knowledge base increases, 
technological accumulation is more based on experience and communication and 
technology is increasingly transfered in a verbal fashion and through inter-personal 
contacts.16  
 
Formal or informal networks are therefore important routes for the transfer of more 
tacit knowledge.17 These networks (including user-supplier relations and bridging 
institutions) are central to the innovation and diffusion.18 As emphasized by Lundvall 
and Johnsson, the learning process is therefore interactive where the institutional set-
up strongly affects the process of learning.19 
 
Such interaction may, and does, take place over national borders and over large 
geographical distances but there are good reasons for suggesting that the interaction 
of firms belonging to the same nation might be the most efficient.20 As Lundvall 
argues in relation to the particular case of user-supplier links: 
 
'When the technology is complex and ever changing, a short distance might be 
important for the competitiveness of both users and producers. Here, the information 
codes must be flexible and complex, a common cultural background might be 
important in order to establish tacit codes of conduct and to facilitate the decoding of 
the complex messages exchanged. The need for short distance will be reinforced when 
user needs are complex and ever changing.' 21 
 
On the other hand, it is well known that a network which reaches outside a dense core 
group, into more distant and less frequent contacts, can be of great importance for 
radical change, i.e. 'the strength of weak ties' in the words of Granovetter.22 This 
points in the direction that a firm needs a set of different contacts for each of the 
different aspects of the innovation23 and diffusion process.24 
 
Moreover, all companies do not necessarily need to have direct contacts, as some 
actors in a network can function as information brokers or 'technological gatekeepers' 
for a local group. In this context, the importance of local meeting places for exchange 
of information has been emphasized25 and it has even been suggested26 that a dual 
network structure for technology diffusion may be appropriate, i.e. one local social 
network where at least one member also is a member of an international network.27 
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c)     The relevance of technological systems or national systems of innovation 
 
These networks, institutions and actors, form through their investment decisions 
highly specific national or regional technological contexts, or systems.28 These give 
rise to, and rest upon significant externalities29 which lie at the heart of the innovation 
and diffusion process. 
 
These features of the innovation and diffusion process strongly suggest that the spatial 
context (nation, region) is not only still relevant in spite of trends towards 
internationalization but strongly influences the rate and direction of the search 
activities which lead to innovations, their subsequent evolution and diffusion.  
 
Evidence of this is found in case studies (factory automation, electronics, material 
technology and pharmaceutical) of Sweden's technological systems.30 In a recent 
study of R&D activities in the automobile industry a similar pattern was found. R,D & 
E activities tend to take place near the home base. 'Only firms pursuing multi-regional 
strategies have partly dispersed R,D & E activities to major regional markets.'31 More 
generalized findings are found in Patel32 who analysed the geographical location of 
patenting activities (in the US) for 569 large firms and concluded that: 
 
'...there is no systematic evidence... to suggest that widespread globalization of 
technological activities has occurred in the 1980's. The evidence... shows that for an 
overwhelming majority of them (firms) technology production remains close to the 
home base.' 33 
 
 
d) Increasing returns as well as inertia34 characterizes the innovation process and 
national systems of innovation 
 
Increasing returns apply to the process of innovation and initial specialization tends 
therefore to be reproduced and strengthened which results in different, uneven and 
divergent technological development amongst countries.35 This immediately raises 
important questions as to the capability of the innovation systems to improve their 
learning capability and, in particular, to adjust to new technical or organisational 
opportunities. Given increasing returns, there is a considerable risk that: 
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* firms, institutions and networks become 'locked in' to the 'old  technologies'. Thus, 
the cumulativeness and path-dependency of innovation may lead to a lock-in into 
technological, organisational and institutional cul-de-sacs.36 
* the process of variety creation is hindered. In other words, there may be feedback 
mechanisms whereby a selection process may consume variety.37 
* if a search for new technology or organisational forms is undertaken outside 
traditional areas, it is done in a highly localized fashion. Thus, the particular 
features of the firm's absorptive capacity38 influences its ability to evaluate new 
technical and organisation innovations and shapes its search process.  
 
 
e) The innovation and diffusion process can not be distinguished in a meaningful 
way 
 
Earlier work on diffusion, in terms of epidemic models39, emphasized that agents are 
imperfectly informed about a new technology and that a learning process, whereby 
partially tacit information is transmitted through observation and demonstration, takes 
place prior to adoption and diffusion. Such a learning process is, of course, interactive 
and therefore the particular characteristics, in terms of networks and institutions, of 
the local innovation or technological system matters for the rate of diffusion.40 
 
However, whilst these models are obviously relevant, the gradual and cumulative 
nature of technical change makes it difficult and misleading to make a clear-cut 
distinction between innovation and diffusion. Indeed, a central feature of the diffusion 
process is how a new product, and the technology embodied in it, alters in the course 
of the diffusion process41.42 It is therefore appropriate to see the diffusion curve as an 
envelope curve which is superimposed on a number of minor diffusion curves.43 
 
 
f) The influence from the supply side 
 
This alteration of the innovation may be a function of feedback from the market 
(learning-by-using, especially among technologically capable and demanding users), 
more resources devoted to R&D among the suppliers (which probably is function of 
prior diffusion44), increasing technological opportunities or changed strategic 
orientation among suppliers wishing to widen the market to segments hitherto 
unexploited but with a different demand characteristics.  
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Some of these features have been incorporated into recent formal models of diffusion. 
Other diffusion models have begun to incorporate supply side factors.45 Although 
useful, they are quite limited in their perception as to which features of the supply 
side that matter.  
 
Less formal analyses46 underline the importance that the strategic behaviour of the 
supplier industry has for a) changing the price/performance ratio of the new product, 
b) altering the product specifications to suit highly differentiated needs of various 
market segments, c) providing various types of services to reduce the percieved risk 
of adopters.  
 
A local supplier industry, i.e. one located within a locationally bounded system, may 
have additional influences on the diffusion process by; d) diffusing information and 
knowledge about the new product through a locally relatively denser marketing 
network, and e) by giving local firms access to the new product in the early phases of 
the product's life when there may be limitations in the capacity or willingness of 
foreign suppliers to supply the product at a geographical distance. To the extent that 
the latter two factors are of importance, the strength of the local supplier industry in 
the technological system will have a bearing on the rate of diffusion. 
 
In conclusion, the innovation and diffusion process is characterized by 
cumulativeness and path-dependency, where networks are conducive to the transfer of 
tacit knowledge and highly localized technological and innovation systems shape the 
search processes. The special features of the local technological systems greatly 
influence the diffusion process and the diffusion process can not be clearly 
distinguished from the innovation process. The strength of the local supplying 
industry and the character of the networks are particularly important features of the 
technological systems. 
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Some Differences and Similarities Between Technical and Organisational 
Innovations 
 
Having reviewed some salient characteristics of the innovation and diffusion process 
of technical innovations, we will proceed with comparing some features of technical 
and organisational innovations. We will structure the discussion in terms of a) 
differences which are intrinsic and how these affect the market for organisational 
innovations and b) differences in the search and implementation processes. First, 
however, a word of caution. The term organisational innovations covers a wide 
spectrum of innovations; for example, it can mean innovations in management 
practices, innovations in the administrative processes or innovations in the formal 
organisational structure. For analytical reasons, it would have been useful to have a 
taxonomy of organisational innovations but since we have not come across one in the 
literature, the discussion below (just as the one in section 2) will have to be carried 
out as if organisational innovations constitute a homogeneous entity.47 
 
 
a) Intrinsic characteristics of organisational innovations and effects on the market 
for organisational innovations 
 
Adopting an organisational innovation represents investment in knowledge, 
procedures, behaviour and relations rather than in artifacts. There are some intrinsic 
characteristics of such investments which we would expect to have a significant 
impact on the innovation and diffusion process in that they have a bearing on the 
particular features of the 'market' for organisational innovations. 
 
First, organisational innovations are characterized by knowledge bases which are of a 
more tacit nature than for technical innovations. Whilst technical innovations have a 
large portion of hardware-embodied as well as a blue-print captured knowledge, the 
person-embodied knowledge for organisational innovations can only be supplemented 
by written rules, instructions, flow diagrams and organisational charts.  
 
The tacit nature of the knowledge base of organisational innovations makes it difficult 
to protect these by patent; that is, imitation is not prevented by legal barriers, which 
creates ownership problems and, possibly, a lack of incentive to spend resources on 
developing organisational innovations48.49 This lack of incentive, as compared to 
developing product innovations, can be compounded by the difficulties in selling 
organisational innovations on a market, thereby reducing the potential returns on any 
investment to develop the knowledge base for organisational innovations.50 
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Second, organisational innovations differ in that the supplier industry, in traditional 
meaning, is non-existent. Consultancy firms may be regarded as some kind of 
suppliers of organisational innovation, where their products consist of a standardised 
concept, which they try to sell and to implement. These firms, however, have a 
limited and difficult role to play due to both the tacit nature of knowledge and to 
particular features of the implementation process, discussed below. Organisational 
innovations, therefore, to a large degree, lack the very important determinant of the 
pattern and speed of diffusion which the supplier industry constitutes as regards 
technical innovations.51 
 
Third, an organisational innovation refers to the creation of knowledge and, therefore, 
the marginal cost of 'production' and selling is equal to the reproduction and transfer 
costs.52 Whilst marginal costs are clearly not zero53 it is expected that the discrepency 
between marginal costs and fixed costs to develop the knowledge is substantial. To 
the extent that there is a market for organisational innovations, this would lead to 
problems of pricing, where price is clearly expected to be far above marginal costs. 
 
Fourth, in addition to the tacitness of knowledge, organisational innovations are more 
difficult to observe, to define, and identify system borders for, than for technical 
innovations. These features of organisational innovations make it problematic to 
speak of a 'product' to be sold and bought on a market.  
 
Finally, the costs and benefits of the 'product', the organisational innovation, are hard 
to evaluate for the potential adopter since trialability and observability could be 
assumed to be lower for organisational innovations than for technical innovations. It 
is, therefore, according to Kimberley, 'difficult to determine, in advance, the direct 
effects of managerial innovations on organisational performance54', i.e. it is difficult 
to find the ex ante criterion of 'profitability' for organisational innovations. 
 
In conclusion, the incentives to develop organisational innovations are relatively poor. 
Consultancy firms can probably not fill the same role as, for example, machinery 
suppliers and there may be pricing problems in the diffusion process. Moreover, the 
product is difficult to define and it is hard to evaluate its costs and benefits.  
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b) The search and implementation process 
 
The features of the 'market' for organisational innovations suggest that it may not 
work very well and that, therefore, the characteristics of the local search process may 
be more important for organisational innovations than for technical innovations, i.e. 
the search process and its conditioning factors are extremely important. Some features 
of this process are listed below. 
 
First, in contrast to technical innovations, organisational innovations do not normally 
have a specialized unit for development and diffusion, analogous to the R&D or 
production engineering functions.55 This may suggest that the search for new and 
improved solutions is not always done in such a conscious and systematic way and 
not even towards explicitly stated goals. 
 
Second, while top management can serve an important function in the adoption 
decision for technical innovations, in the case where there are explicitly stated goals 
for organisational change, the importance of top management involvement and visible 
support in order to implement organisational innovations is of another magnitude, as 
has been emphasized by most scholars.56 
 
Organisational innovations concern humans, their behaviour and attitudes, relations 
and work tasks. It has been found that subordinates to a very large extent 'read' the 
behaviour of their managers in finding out what is really important, i.e. it is what the 
top manager does and visibly shows that gets most focus, not merely what he says.57 
 
Third, organisational innovations often affect a larger number of individuals than 
most technical innovations. This means that a greater number of people or sub units 
within an organisation must support, or at least not openly resist, an organisational 
innovation before it is adopted58.59 Moreover, as pointed out by Teece, a major 
organisational innovation typically involves organisational disruption in that it is 
associated with a major reassignment of tasks.60 Taken jointly, this may mean that 
organisational innovations meet greater internal challenge than technical 
innovations.61 
 
Fourth, due to the difficulties in defining the 'product', organisational innovations can 
be shaped by the subjective interpretations of the adopter.62 The initial interpretation 
and the shaping of it to local contexts is, however, not usually done by all the affected 
people. Different categories of actors meet the innovation at different times and can 
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therefore influence the precise character of the organisational innovation to different 
degrees. One assumption is that the early adopters within a firm have the largest 
influence and to some extent 'standardise' the shape for continued internal diffusion.63 
However, in spite of this initial standardisation, organisational innovations can, to a 
larger extent than technical innovations, be assumed to gradually change while 
diffusing within a firm. 
 
Fifth, the complementarity of technical and organisational innovations has been 
emphasized by several scholars.64 
 
'The range of managerial options for achieving successful technology transfer 
includes changes in the user environment as well as in the technology itself and 
frequently the same misalignments can be addressed either way.' ...'A major 
proposition implied by this framework is that change in both technology and user 
environment is more beneficial than holding one constant and changing the other.' 65 
 
This way of looking at change and adoption as an issue of obtaining a balanced 
approach.66 In a similar way, studies of organisational change, developed from an 
organisational development perspective, have emphasized the need to consider 
simultaneously not only technical and social systems, but also political and cultural 
systems67.68 
 
In conclusion, whilst organisational innovations and technical innovations share the 
feature of mutual dependency, organisational innovations differ distinctly from 
technical innovations in that:  
 
* the market is expected to work relatively poorly due to features on both the 
demand side (difficulties in defining and evaluating the 'product') and supply side 
(pricing, incentives and appropriability problems, lack of a supplier industry);  
* the importance of the local characteristics of the search process is presumably 
more accentuated and; 
* this search process is much determined by factors which are expected to vary 
greatly between firms (degree of conscious search, degree of local top management 
involvement, degree of internal challenge, the process of shaping and diffusing the 
innovation internally in the firm). 
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Implications for Analysing the Diffusion of Organisational Innovations 
 
These features of the 'market' and the search and implementation process of 
organisational innovations have important implications for their innovation and 
diffusion process. Not only is it difficult to know what to search for and what to 
implement but the features of the 'market' for organisational innovations mean that a 
whole set of issues arises: Which modes of transfer can be used to compensate for a 
poorly developed supply side; what is the role of networks in the diffusion of this 
highly tacit knowledge; what is the cost of non-market mediated transfer and what 
determines it? Moreover, the particular features of the search and implementation 
process suggest that a set of issues related to inertia, the cumulativeness of innovation 
and path-dependency appear highly relevant. These issues will be discussed in some 
detail in this section, beginning with the question of what the 'animal' really is. 
 
 
a) What is the animal and when is it adopted? 
 
As mentioned above, it appears to be more difficult to observe, define and identify 
system borders for organisational innovations than for technical innovations. Along 
with the subjective interpretation of an organisational innovation and the shaping of it 
in the intrafirm diffusion process, these features makes it difficult to specify what the 
innovation really is. What system borders does it have, is it the first trial version, or is 
it a later form, which most probably contains elements of further invention? 
Moreover, when should a organisational innovation be considered adopted by a firm? 
Is it the first time, e.g. when a new incentive system is being used on an experimental 
basis within a limited part of the organisation, or is it when the organisational 
innovation has a wider range of application within the organisation, possibly after 
being modified as a result of the first trial implementation?69  
 
 
b) The importance of the 'inside' of the firm, inertia, user competence70 and  
 unlearning 
 
An extensive intrafirm diffusion is, of course, a precondition for observing any effects 
on the firm level. Since, the framework presented earlier, based on literature primarily 
within the field of economics of innovation and diffusion, focuses on interfirm 
diffusion, there is a need of a supplementary framework in order to analyse the 
diffusion processes inside firms. Intrafirm diffusion is the focus for literature dealing 
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with implementation of innovations.71 This line of literature is to a large extent 
normative, case-based and often written by practitioners.72 Another 
theoretical/practical approach is represented by the literature on change in general, 
where scholars within the organisational development school have a prominent 
position.73 Due to a whole set of factors (e.g. the high degree of alterations in the 
diffusion process and the involvement of top management, etc.), this focus on the 
'inside' of the organisation may be even more essential when it concerns 
organisational innovations than technical innovations. 
 
As organisational innovations refer to relations between people, relations which are a 
function of institutions, we could expect there to be a considerable organisational 
inertia. Such an inertia could well be argued to be strengthened by the often 
significant 'set-up' costs and organisational disruption that follow upon an 
organisational innovation.74 The difficulties in experimenting with, usually indivisible, 
new organisational innovations would also tend to reinforce the cumulative character 
of organisational innovations. In other words, new organisational forms grow out of 
the old ones75 and the adoption of a specific innovation is influenced by earlier 
innovations that have been adopted or rejected. In principle, the diffusion of a 
particular innovation can be affected by parallel76, sequential77, or synergistic78 
innovations.79 
 
As was discussed in section 2, inertia is a feature of the innovation and diffusion 
process of technical innovations but the subjective interpretation of organisational 
innovations, their malleability to prevailing organisational forms, and the close link 
between organisational innovations and the larger cultural and social context, may 
mean that this inertia is even greater in the case of technical innovations. Thus, path-
dependency, the tendency to lock-in to a particular organisational path, is probably 
even stronger for organisational innovations than for technical innovations. 
 
Inertia can also be expected to be found at the national level where a whole set of 
institutions may shape a path-dependent process of organisational development. An 
example is the Swedish (and Nordic) work organisation which since the 1960s has 
emphasized group-oriented, democratic and participatory models. The role of 
institutions in this process can be illustrated by how the focus of 'democratization' 
shifted from the firm to the bargaining table of the union and management at the 
central level coupled to new legislation (MBL) developed in the 1970s. At the same 
time, new institutions, such as 'Arbetslivscentrum' (Swedish Centre for Working Life) 
were created to support the orientation of the national system of innovation towards 
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the use of these models.80 Hence, as for technical innovations, the process of path-
dependency goes much beyond the individual firms. 
 
To be able to break this path-dependency, companies need to 'unlearn', i.e. to abandon 
earlier practices and behaviours which were found useful and beneficial during an 
earlier stage. Kimberley points out that: 
 
'.. almost nothing has been done on exnovation - the removal of an innovation from an 
organisation. Exnovation occurs when an organisation divests itself of an innovation 
in which it had previously invested. In some cases, exnovation may be different from 
what Zaltman et al. (1973) called discontinued use.' He continues: 'All managerial 
innovations are not right for all organisations at the same point in time. At any given 
time, organisations are in different stages in their life cycles (Kimberley, 1976a)...' 
and 'To be effective, managerial innovation must be implemented and used. 
Organisations must know when to dispose of innovations previously adopted as well 
as when to adopt new ones .' 81 
 
The ability to 'unlearn', break away from the old way of doing things, is among other 
things, dependent on the competence of the users. However, as distinct from technical 
innovations, the users are part and parcel of what is required to change. This may well 
mean that it is more difficult to articulate a demand for organisational innovations 
which depart from the prevailing ones. 'Technological distance', discussed in section 
2, may therefore have an analogue 'organisational distance'.82 It can be hypothesized 
(and should be tested) that the more distant the new way of working is from the 
present way of working, the greater the resistance and the longer it takes before the 
decision is made to adopt the innovation.83  
 
 
c) The cost of transfer and implementation of organisational innovations 
 
Whilst the marginal costs for the supplier refers to the reproduction and selling costs, 
the cost for the user lies in the transfer and implementation costs. As mentioned 
above, these costs are usually significant84, which may affect both the pace and the 
pattern of diffusion. The high costs may occur for several reasons.  
 
First, although there is no patent protection against imitation, the poor observability 
and the tacitness of the knowledge makes it difficult and costly to imitate an 
organisational innovation. Second, and as was mentioned above, there may be high 
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costs in terms of organisational disruption. Third, organisational innovation may need 
to be adjusted to a greater extent than technical innovations to the specific 
circumstances of each firm85 which would suggest additional transfer costs. Indeed, 
there are similarities to the technical innovations' envelope curve (cf chapter 2) in that 
the product is not homogenous throughout its diffusion process. However, for 
organisational innovations, the diffusion curve may include a relatively large number 
of firm specific variants. Fourth, at times it may even be that the organisational 
innovation is overly wedded to the present organisational solution of each new 
adopter. This may arise as a consequence of the necessarily subjective interpretation 
of an organisational innovation, the fact that it refers to the relations between people 
and the large number of groups which may influence the particular features of an 
organisational innovation when it is implemented. This may not only be counter-
productive, in the sense that the advantages of the organisational innovation may be 
lost when it is adjusted to the particular 'path' of the firm, but it may also be connected 
with unnecessarily high transfer costs.  
 
In order to reduce the transfer and implementation costs, it may be important to try to 
standardise the organisational innovation's content and implementation as far as 
possible. In addition, the possibility of 'standardising' an organisational innovation can 
be assumed to influence the possibilities of seeing a major national impact from the 
organisational innovation. An example of this is the 'standardisation' done in Japan by 
The Union of Japanese Scientists and Engineers (JUSE), who designed a set of 
problem-solving tools most useful for the shop floor level (7 QC-tools) and another 
set of tools for engineers in Japanese industry (7 management tools) to be useful for 
the majority of the situations that an engineer encounters. In a similar way JUSE has 
tried to 'standardise' the characteristics of Japanese Total Quality Control (TQC), 
which can be seen as a major organisational innovation or maybe composed by 
several sub-innovations.86 The Malcolm Baldrige National Quality Award, The 
European Quality Award and The Swedish Quality Award show some similarity in 
their way of providing check-lists, but they do not try to standardise to the same 
extent.  
 
In similar way implementation can be 'standardised' in order to facilitate and increase 
the success-rate. The practices of many consultancy firms is based on the assumption 
that it is possible to develop one way that suit most, although not all, companies. For 
consultancy firms this is in itself a driver, as the potential for profit is greatly 
increased if certain practices to a large extent can be repeated over and over again, 
given that other things, such as price, are equal. This way of thinking is essentially 
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'industrial' and has a direct parallel in technical innovation, where the choice of a new 
product idea is made on the basis that the product is general, in that it suits the needs 
of many potential customers.87 
 
In Japan once again, the implementation and diffusion of QC-tools, QC-circle 
activities, etc. have been 'standardised' in order to reach a maximum number of firms 
in the society with a proven solution that works well in most cases (and avoiding 
excessive adaptation at each firm). This is also one reason why the diffusion rate of 
the organisational innovation TQC has been quite high, regardless of the difficulty of 
estimating the economic effects of organisational innovations in general. 
 
 
d) The length of the diffusion process and modes of transfer of organisational  
 innovations 
 
For a whole set of reasons (high set-up costs in terms of organisational disruption, 
difficulties in estimating the performance of organisational innovations, inertia among 
potential adopters, etc.), we would expect a tendency among potential adopters to 
delay any decision and in extreme cases act only when there is a severe profit 
crisis88.89 In the case of the automobile industry, Womack et al. made the following 
comment: 'In the absence of a crisis threatening the very survival of the company, 
only limited progress seems to be possible'.90 91 92 
 
On the other hand, this delay in adoption, which frequently occurs when 
organisational innovations are concerned, can give firms an opportunity to create a 
competitive advantage over a lengthy diffusion period. The firms who can benefit are 
early and aggressive adopters93 who have a superior organisational competence.94 
Because of the poor functioning of the market in promoting the diffusion of 
organisational innovations, other mechanisms for diffusing organisational innovations 
must, therefore, be identified and analyzed.95 
 
As underlined above, the costs and benefits of organisational innovations are hard to 
evaluate since trialability and observability could be assumed to be low and there is 
no analogus criterion to 'profitability' as for technical innovations. Hence, other 
criteria will be used in making decisions to adopt organisational innovations. One 
criterion that has been put forward is that firms tend to imitate other influential firms 
that can be seen as role models.  
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'One criterion is the status of other organisations previously adopting'..., i.e. 
...'imitation is likely to play a more significant role in the diffusion and adoption of 
organisational innovation than of technological innovation.' 96 
 
As was discussed earlier, imitation takes place through a process of interactive 
learning whereby partially tacit information is diffused through networks and with the 
help of institutions. There are, therefore, good reasons to focus on the features of 
these systems of innovation when explaining the process of diffusion of 
organisational innovations. 
 
The poorly functioning market for organisational innovations suggests that networks 
can have an even more central function to play in the diffusion of organisational 
innovations as compared to technical innovations. Through the network, the firm has 
access to communication channels, both formal and informal, where it can find social 
legitimacy, technical support and draw upon the experience of other members. This 
will reduce uncertainty and risks, both perceived and actual. The network may also 
provide slack resources, which can be used in the case of unexpected problems in the 
implementation process.  
 
Networks can, however, both strengthen or weaken the process of unlearning and 
diffusion of a new organisational form. Some aspects of a network seem particularly 
important. The size of it may matter. With a larger network, the information passing 
through may not only be larger but also more diversified. As was mentioned in 
section 2, it is probably important to belong to dual networks in order to reduce the 
risks of being locked-in to a particular organisational path.97 The amount of slack 
resources may also be affected by the scale of the network. For these reasons, access 
to a larger and more diversified network(s) may facilitate adoption and speed up 
diffusion. Moreover, compatibility of network participants and the maturity of the 
network would also be expected to favour diffusion of state of the art organisational 
innovations.98 
 
On the other hand, geographical dispersion can pose a major barrier to interfirm 
communication and a greater physical separation in a network will probably weaken 
the functioning of the network. In addition, a too heavy reliance on 'within network' 
information sources can stifle the diffusion of innovations by reducing the number of 
contacts that members have with information sources outside the network.   
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Institutions matters too for the diffusion process. Returning to the Japanese example, 
the standardised implementation procedure of TQC was preceeded by many 
observable cases of earlier implementation within Japanese firms which could more 
easily be imitated through JUSEs standardised procedures (i.e. the diffusion followed 
an imitation pattern)99. This removed the need to make separate economic calculation 
of the benefits of TQC for each company. Instead it is expressed as a 'belief' in Japan 
that the implementation of TQC will result in increased market share and 
profitability.100 
 
JUSE substituted in this case for the absence of a supplier industry. Besides this kind 
of industry association, other mechanisms exists. For example, collective research 
institutes, such as the Swedish Institute of Production Engineering Research, as well 
as Universities, can be viewed both as bridging institutions in networks and as 
compensating mechanisms for the lack of a supplier industry. These institutions can, 
therefore, not only act as 'brokers' but also as educational institutes which transfer 
knowledge of organisational innovations to industry and services.101 
 
A special case in the process of unlearning and diffusion of organisational innovations 
are the 'check-lists' for self-evaluation developed by collective research institutes and 
which are diffused by involving firms in a competition for Awards, e.g. Malcolm 
Baldrige National Quality Award in the USA, the Swedish Quality Award, or the 
European Quality Award. By following these check-lists (and eventually competing 
for the award), companies are strongly influenced to abandon earlier practices and 
adopt the principles of Total Quality Management.102 
 
However, as a consequence of the tacit nature of the knowledge base of organisational 
innovations, the importance of 'unlearning', and the central role of top management 
involvement in change processes, we would expect there to be a limit to the degree to 
which such institutions can act as diffusion mechanisms. The transfer of key-people 
within firms, e.g. MNCs, and between firms, is probably therefore another key 
diffusion mechanism.103 104 
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Conclusions 
 
We started out this essay in asking ourselves what the more recent literature on 
technical innovation and diffusion can contribute to shaping an analytical framework 
for studying the diffusion of organisational innovations. A first answer is that it 
probably has a great deal to contribute. The whole set of issues related to the 
cumulative nature of innovation, inertia and path-dependency appears to be highly 
relevant to organisational innovations. This refers to both the internal characteristics 
of the search and implementation process in firms, which is clearly of great 
importance, and to the wider context of networks, institutions and national systems of 
innovation geared towards particular trajectories. One of these issues refers to the 
difficulties encountered when trying to separate the innovation and diffusion 
processes. This is presumably even more accentuated for organisational innovations 
than for technical innovations. The role of national systems of innovation in finding 
non-market mediated transfer of organisational innovations would also seem to be of 
central importance due to the particular characteristics of the 'market' for 
organisational innovations. Institutions and networks, therefore, presumably matter 
greatly in the diffusion process of these innovations. 
 
Thus, we can draw a number of interesting implications for an eventual analytical 
framework for studying the diffusion of organisational innovations. 
 
First, the evasive nature of organisational innovations suggest that the definition of 
the object of the study need to be given special attention: 
 
* where is the system boundary, what should be included in a specific organisational 
innovation? 
* how should the temporal aspect of the innovation be handled, i.e. the process of 
continuous adaptation and change? The organisational innovation that reaches a 
firm's boundaries is usually not the same after some time, because of continued 
innovative or adaptive activities. 
* when should an organisational innovation be considered to be adopted? Is it the 
first time management make a decision to use the innovation, or is it when it is 
implemented to a certain degree inside the adopting firm, and if so, to what extent? 
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Second, assuming that: 
 
* user competence is critical for the diffusion process; 
* that 'unlearning' is central to the diffusion process; 
* inertia, the cumulative nature of the innovation process may be even more 
accentuated for organisational innovations; and 
* organisational innovations are to a large degree tacit and need to have firm-specific 
adjustment, 
 
then, the experience base of the firm for handling organisational innovations is central 
to understanding the diffusion process. Thus, factors shaping the learning process 
within firms ought to be a central for studying the diffusion of organisational 
innovations. In other words, the absorptive capacity of firms, and what shapes the 
nature of it, needs to be understood. In this context, the concept of 'organisational 
distance' may be elaborated on and measured. 
 
Third, given the special features of the 'market' for organisational innovations, we 
would expect that the market functions poorly and that, therefore, other modes of 
transfer have to compensate for that weakness. One of these compensating 
mechanisms is the position of the firms in various networks. Another is institutions 
such as industry associations and universities. Finally, the movement of tacit 
knowledge embodied in top-level management between and within firms presumably 
matters greatly. How well these compensating mechanisms work is presumably a key 
determining factor of the rate of diffusion in a given economy. 
 
Fourth, to reduce the transfer and implementation costs, a certain degree of 
standardisation, of both the innovation itself and of its implemention, may be 
required. It seems essential to study these processes of standardisation. 
 
Fifth, there is a need to look at diffusion of innovations in a wider context. It includes 
interdependencies of innovations, in relations that can be sequential, complementary, 
as well as directly or indirectly competing. It also includes cumulativeness and path-
dependency, as well as factors influencing unlearning on national levels. 
 
 
        
  
20
 
Acknowledgement 
 
We would like to acknowledge the financial support from the Swedish Institute for 
Quality (SIQ) and the Swedish Council for Work Life Research. 
An early version of this paper was presented at the conference on 'Technological and 
Industrial Development', arranged by Chalmers University of Technology, Stockholm 
School of Economics and NUTEK. We are grateful to the participants in our session, 
in particular Charles Edquist, for comments. We are also grateful to the doctoral 
students in Work Organisation at the School of Technology Management and 
Economics, Chalmers University of Technology, for a very fruitful discussion in 
another seminar. Howard Rush and John Bessant gave valuable comments on a 
subsequent draft. 
 
 Notes and References 
                                                          
1 See B. Carlsson, 'Reflections on Industrial Dynamics', International Journal of Industrial Organisation, 5, 1987, 
pp.135-148, for deliniation of the field of enquiry which he labels Industrial Dynamics. 
2 F. Damanpour, K. A. Szabat & W. M. Evan, 'The relationship between types of innovation and organisational 
performance', Journal of Management Studies, Vol.26, No.6, pp.587-601, 1989, and E. Rogers, Diffusion of 
Innovations 3rd ed., (New York, The Free Press, 1983). 
3 Innovation is here defined according to Rogers (1983) as 'any idea, object, or practice that is perceived as new 
by the members of the social system', i.e. the innovation is viewed from the perspective of the customer and not 
that of the producer. In addition, in this paper the concepts of organisational, administrative and managerial 
innovation are used interchangeably. Administrative innovations are sometimes seen as encompassing both 
organisational change and change in management system (Damanpour et al. 1989), while others use the concept 
organisational innovation in the same wide sense. In the present paper, the three concepts are used 
interchangeably.  
4 D. Teece (1981, p: 173, cited in Edquist 1992) argues that 'Business historians have long been aware that 
organisational innovations have had remarkable productivity ramifications. A.H. Cole has asserted that "if 
changes in business procedures and practices were patentable, the contributions of business change to the 
economic growth of the nation would be as widely recognised as the influence of mechanical innovations".' 
5 C. Edquist , 'Technological and Organisational Innovations, Productivity and Employment', World Employment 
Programme Research Working Paper, WEP 2-22/WP.233, 1992. 
6 P.A. David, 'Path-Dependency: Putting the Past into the Future', Stanford University, Institute for Mathematical 
Studies in the Social Sciences, Economic Series, Technical Report No 553, November, 1988, and G. Dosi, 
‘Sources, Procedures and Microeconomic Effects of Innovation’, Journal of Economic Literature, Vol. XXVI 
(September), 1988, pp.1120-1171, and G. Dosi, K. Pavitt & L. Soete, The Economics of Technical Change and 
International Trade, (Harvester/Wheatsheaf, 1990), and G. Dosi, D. Teece & S. Winter, ‘Toward a theory of 
corporate coherence’, in: G. Dosi,  R. Giannetti, P.A. Toninelli (Eds), Technology and the Enterprise in a 
Historical Perspective (Oxford, Oxford University Press,1991), and B.Å. Lundvall (Ed), National Systems of 
Innovation. Towards a Theory of Innovation and Interactive Learning, (London, Francis Pinter, 1992), and S. 
Metcalfe, ‘The Economic Foundations of Technology Policy: Equilibrium and Evolutionary Perspectives’, mimeo, 
(University of Manchester, 1992), and P. Patel & K. Pavitt,  ‘Uneven (and divergent) technological development 
amongst countries and firms: evidence and explanations’, mimeo, (Science Policy Research Unit, University of 
Sussex, U.K, 1993). 
7 Lundvall 1992, op. cit., Ref. 5. 
8 Dosi 1988, op. cit., Ref.5.  
9 G. Dosi, ‘The nature of the innovative process’, in: G. Dosi, C. Freeman, R. Nelson, G. Silverberg, & L. Soete 
(Eds), Technical Change and Economic Theory (London, Francis Pinter, 1988), p. 225 
        
  
21
                                                                                                                                                                      
10 David 1988 and Dosi et al. 1991, op. cit., Ref.6 
11 This may be less so for radical technical change than for incremental change. Many times though, it appears as 
if technological discontinuities build upon, and expand a firm's existing technology base rather than replacing it 
(see e.g. O. Granstrand & S. Jacobsson, ‘When are Technological Changes Distruptive? - A Preliminary Analysis 
of Intervening Variables Between Technological and Economic Changes’, Paper presented at the Marstrand 
Symposium on Economics of Technology, (Marstrand, Sweden, August, 1991), and P. Patel & K. Pavitt, 'The 
continuing, widespread (and neglected) importance of improvements in mechanical technologies', mimeo, 
(Science Policy Research Unit, University of Sussex, U.K, 1993), and C. Oscarsson, Technology diversification - 
the phenomenon, its causes and effects, Doctoral dissertation, (Department of Industrial Management and 
Economics, Chalmers University of Technology, Gothenburg, Sweden, 1993). 
12 Granstrand & Jacobsson 1991, op. cit., Ref.11 
13 In a corresponding way, the concept of 'technological families' introduced by Gustafsson (1981) is based on the 
rationale that there are product groups which share a common technology base, and that the learning processes are 
facilitated if they occur in related production technologies. (see H. Gustavsson, ‘On-the-Job Learning and 
Resource Allocation in Developing Countries: A measurement problem in project appraisal and a proposal to its 
solution’, Master Thesis, (University of Sussex, UK, 1981). 
14 A network is here defined as actors, e.g. firms, organisations, associations, or individuals engaged in the 
production, distribution, or use of goods, services, and knowledge. In these networks, information is spread via 
personal contacts, either formally or informally. 
15 Dosi 1988 and Metcalfe 1992, op. cit., Ref. 6, and D.S. Landes, Inaugural lecture at the E.A.R.I.E. 18th Annual 
Conference, (Ferrara, Italy, September 1-3, 1991). 
16 Metcalfe 1992, op. cit., Ref. 6 
17 ibid. and E. Rogers, 'The Rise of Silicon Valley', mimeo, (Institute for Communication Research, Stanford 
University, 1981). 
18 E. von Hippel, The Sources of Innovation, (New York, Oxford University Press, 1988, and B. Carlsson & S. 
Jacobsson, ‘Technological Systems and Economic Policy: The Diffusion of Factory Automation in Sweden’, 
Research Policy, forthcoming, 1993. 
19 B.Å. Lundvall, 'Introduction', in Lundvall, (Ed), (1992), op. cit., Ref. 5, and B. Johnsson, 'Institutional 
Learning', in Lundvall, (Ed), (1992), op. cit., Ref. 5. 
20 Information technology may to some extent reduce the negative effect of geographical distance (Daniels & 
Daniels 1993, and Davenport 1993), but there are limitations in terms of transferring information of a more tacit 
nature. (See J. L. Daniels & N. C. Daniels, Global Vision - Building New Models for the Corporation of the 
Future, (New York, McGraw-Hill, 1993), and T. H. Davenport, Process Innovation - Reengineering Work through 
Information Technology, (Boston, Harvard Business School Press, 1993). 
21 B. Å. Lundvall, ‘Innovation as an interactive process; from user-supplier interaction to the national system of 
innovation’, in Dosi, G; Freeman, C; Nelson, R, Silverberg, G and Soete, L (Eds), Technical Change and 
Economic Theory, (London, Francis Pinter, 1988, p.355). 
22 M. S. Granovetter, 'The Strength of Weak Ties', American Journal of Sociology, No.78, 1973, pp.1360-1380. 
23 For the R&D process it is known that an R&D team needs different kind of contacts during different phases of 
the development process. During early phases, the team benefits from many and disperse contacts (including 
weak-ties), while during later phases, the successful teams mostly turn inward and limit the outside contacts to a 
vital few (See T. Allen, Managing the Flow of Technology, (Cambridge, MA, The MIT Press, 1984), and S. 
Sjölander, Innovation och Företagsförnyelse-Ideutveckling och Idehantering i Företag, (Malmö, Liber, 1983) in 
Swedish). 
24 Given a basic technical understanding and a common language of communication, one single contact to a 
capable machinery supplier, not necessarily in the vicinity, can provide a firm with the latest technology ahead of 
most international competitors, e.g. as was the case for a small Swedish company producing advanced technical 
textiles, which had very well established links to an advanced German machinery supplier (S. Alänge & 
S.Jacobsson,  'Svensk Tekoindustris Infrastruktur', Report submitted to NUTEK, (NUTEK, Stockholm, 1992).   
25 cf. I. Frej, 'Grundläggande teknologier för småindustrietablering', Examensarbete, no. 1980-9 (Masters Thesis in 
Swedish), (Göteborg, Dept. of Industrial Management, Chalmers University of Technology, 1981), and E. M. 
Rogers & D.L. Kincaid, Communication Networks -  towards a new paradigm for research, (New York, The Free 
Press, 1981). 
26 G. Reitberger, 'Forskning om teknikspridning', Report submitted to the National Swedish Board for Technical 
Development (STU), (Stockholm, STU, 1984), and B. Johannisson, 'Business and Local Community - Swedish 
experiences from bottom-up planning for local industrial development', Report 1985:4, (Östersund, University of 
Östersund, 1985). 
27 International colloborative R&D ventures have increasingly become a form of extended contacts (Mowery 
1987) which indicates that even international network can be of a tight nature. (See D. Mowery,  Alliance Politics 
and Economics - Multinational Joint Ventures in Commercial Aircraft, (Cambridge, MA, Ballinger, 1987). 
        
  
22
                                                                                                                                                                      
28 B. Carlsson & R. Stankiewicz, 'On the Nature, Function, and Composition of Technological Systems', Journal 
of Evolutionary Economics, 1 (2), 1991, pp.93-118, and Lundvall 1992, op. cit., Ref. 5, and R. Nelson (Ed.), 
National Innovation Systems; A Comparative Analysis, (Oxford University Press, 1993). 
29 Dosi et al. 1990, op. cit., Ref. 6, B. Carlsson & S. Jacobsson, ‘Technological Systems and Industrial Policy’, in: 
C. Freeman & D. Foray (Eds), Technology and Competitiveness. The Dynamics of Created Advantages, (Pinter 
Publishers, 1991), and Carlsson & Jacobsson 1993, op. cit., Ref. 18. 
30 B. Carlsson, G. Eliasson, A. Granberg, S. Jacobsson & R. Stankiewicz, 'Sveriges teknologiska system och 
framtida konkurrenskraft', report submitted to NUTEK, (Stockholm, NUTEK, 1992). 
31 Miller (1994) found that the process of large scale innovation, the acceleration of product development, and the 
increasing strategic importance of technology were factors contributing to the concentration of R, D & E activities 
close to the home base. Factors limiting the concentration were the dispersion of foreign sales, the surveillance of 
competitors' engineering and styling activities, and the support of foreign assembly plants. Furthermore, the 
development of global networks is constrained by communication difficulties, travel time and cost, and by 
pressures for regional autonomy. (See R. Miller, 'Global R&D networks and large-scale innovations: The case of 
the automobile industry', Research Policy, Vol.23, No.1, 1994, pp.27-46. 
32 P. Patel, ‘Localized Production of Technology for Global Markets’, mimeo, (University of Sussex, UK, Science 
Policy Research Unit, 1993). 
33 However, recent interview data suggest that firms who have a global marketing strategy including a wish to be 
perceived as a local entity on each market, to an increasing extent are also in the process of globalizing their R&D, 
e.g. ABB, Honda, IBM, Motorola and NEC. 
34 Inertia is here defined as unwillingness to change or, if a change is implemented, to change in certain, already 
known, directions. On the level of the whole organisation, the company is usually said to be 'path-dependent'. 
35  Patel & Pavitt 1993, op. cit., Ref. 6. 
36 W. Cohen & D. Levinthal, ‘Absorptive Capacity: A New Perspective on Learning and Innovation’, 
Administrative Science Quarterly, 35, 1990, pp. 128-152, and Lundvall 1992, op. cit., Ref. 5, and B. Carlsson & S. 
Jacobsson, ‘Technological Systems and Development Potentials - a Policy Discussion’, mimeo, (Department of 
Industrial Management and Economics, Chalmers University of Technology and Department of Economics, Case 
Western Reserve University, Cleveland, 1993). 
37 Metcalfe 1992, op. cit., Ref. 6. 
38 Cohen & Levinthal 1990, op. cit., Ref. 36. 
39 see C. Thirtle & V. Ruttan, The role of demand and supply in the generation and diffusion of technical change, 
(Harwood Academic Publishers, 1987). 
40 Carlsson & Jacobsson 1993, op. cit., Ref. 18, and J. Bessant & H. Rush, ‘Building bridges for innovation; the 
role of consultants in technology transfer’, Research Policy, 1994, (forthcoming). 
41 N. Rosenberg, Perspectives on Technology, (Cambridge University Press, 1976), and B. Gold, ‘Technological 
diffusion in industry; research needs and shortcomings’, The Journal of Industrial Economics, Vol. XXIX, no.3, 
1981, pp. 247-269. 
42 The example of numerically controlled machine tools (NCMT) can illustrate this feature. Whilst the first NCMT 
was produced as early as in 1955, it took two major changes (and twenty years) in the underlying technology base 
and associated price/performance characteristics (and a whole range of minor improvements) before NCMTs 
began to be diffused on a large scale (S. Jacobsson, Electronics and industrial policy. The case of computer 
controlled lathes. World Industry Studies 5, (London, Allen & Unwin, 1986), and E. Ehrnberg & S. Jacobsson, 
‘Technological Discontinuity and Competitive Strategy -Revival through FMS for the European Machine Tool 
Industry?’ In Technological Forecasting and Social Change, 1993).  
43 E. Ehrnberg & S. Jacobsson, 'Technological Discontinuities, Industry Structure and Firm Strategy- The Case of 
Machine Tools and Flexible Manufacturing Systems', Department of Industrial Management and Economics, 
Chalmers University of Technology, Gothenburg, Sweden, 1991, and Metcalfe 1992, op. cit., Ref. 6. 
44 Metcalfe 1992, op. cit., Ref. 6.  
45 For a review, see Thirtle & Ruttan 1987, op. cit., Ref. 39. 
46 Rosenberg 1976, op. cit., Ref. 41, Ehrnberg & Jacobsson 1993, op. cit., Ref. 42, Carlsson & Jacobsson 1991, op. 
cit., Ref. 29, Carlsson & Jacobsson 1993, op. cit., Ref. 18. 
47 Edquist 1992, op. cit., Ref. 5, briefly discusses this issue and makes a distinction between organisational 
innovations with respect to their factor saving biasses and the degree to which they can be transferred between 
countries. 
48 D. Teece, ‘The diffusion of an administrative innovation’, Management Science, Vol. 26, No.5, May, 1980, pp. 
464-470. 
49 On the other hand, tacit knowledge is easier to protect. 
50 As the importance of company specific organisational techniques are realized, we will probably still see an 
increasing priority given to developments of the firm's knowledge base in this field; investments which may have 
little to do with selling on the market. 
51 For an analysis of the role of consultants in technology transfer, see Bessant & Rush 1994, op. cit., Ref. 40. 
        
  
23
                                                                                                                                                                      
52 Teece 1980, op. cit., Ref. 48. 
53 D. Teece, The Multinational Corporation and the Resource Cost of International Technology Transfer, 
(Cambridge, MA Ballinger, 1976). 
54 J. R. Kimberley, 'Managerial Innovation', in P. C. Nystroem & W. H. Starbuck (Eds),  Handbook of 
Organisational Design, (New York, Oxford University Press, 1981, p: 87). 
55 There are companies that have developed a search and development function for organisational practices, e.g. 
units within the Motorola University. 
56 Cf. S. Alänge, 'Total Quality Management as a Tool for Organisational Change', CIM Working Paper, No. WP 
1992-01, (Göteborg, Chalmers University of Technology, 1992), and P. Spenley, World Class Performance 
through Total Quality - A Practical Guide to Implementation, (London, Chapman & Hall, 1992). 
57 The worst case of course being when a mixed message is provided, when there is no correspondence between 
what the boss says and what he/she does. 
58 Kimberley 1981, op. cit., Ref. 54. 
59 In large corporations it has been found that major organisational change programmes started by a central 
corporate office usually lead to failure. Instead, a success pattern has been found when an organisational 
innovation first is adopted, adapted and diffused by line management in a subunit, division etc., and then later on, 
when an internal success case exist, the innovation can be diffused and implemented on a wider scale within the 
corporation. (See M. Beer, R. A. Eisenstat, & B. Spector, 'Why Change Programs Don't Produce Change', 
Harvard Business Review, November-December 1990, pp.158-166. 
60 Teece 1980, op. cit., Ref. 48. 
61  Empirical work is required to verify whether or not this is the case. 
62  This subjective view is further reinforced by the consultancy firm's interest in packaging organisational 
innovations and making their offer unique. The result is that essentially the same innovation is described in 
different sets of 'proprietary' concepts. E.g. Western consultancy firms catching up on the experiences developed 
within Japanese industry (in Japan called TQC, CWQC or Toyota management system, etc) describe their own 
packaged offers in terms such as 'resourceful organisations', 'horizontal organisations', etc. What the consultancy 
firms add to the general concept and features of TQC is primarily their experience of analysing and implementing 
the concept in a larger number of firms. This experience contains a strong factor of learning for each time the 
innovation is implemented, which is culture specific depending on the nation/region and corporation in which the 
consultant has been active. 
63 This 'standardising' has been seen as a factor slowing the internal diffusion process (H. Hasselbladh, 
Administrativa innovationer i organisationer, (Uppsala, Department of Business Administration, University of 
Uppsala, 1991). On the other hand, the opposite view is probably more common and recommended in normative 
books, i.e. often the initial use of a pilot project which lays the foundation for a firm specific standardisation is 
prescribed.  
64 Cf. D. Leonard-Barton, 'Implementation as mutual adaptation of technology and organisation', Research Policy, 
17, 1988,  pp. 251-267, and Damanpour et al. 1989, op. cit., Ref. 2. 
65 Leonard-Barton 1988, op. cit., Ref. 64. 
66 E. Trist, ‘The Evolution of Socio-Technical Systems’, Occasional Paper, No.2, 1981, Ontario Quality of Work 
Life Centre, Toronto. 
67 N. Tichy, Managing Strategic Change - Technical, Political and Cultural Dynamics, (New York, John Wiley & 
Sons, 1983), and  Alänge 1992, op. cit., Ref. 56,  
68 Edquist 1992, op. cit., Ref. 5, emphasizes that the distinction between technological and organisational change 
is analytical in nature because it is extremely difficult to distinguish sharply between them in the real world, and 
the two concepts are often related to one another in an often complex way. 
69 A common definition of an innovation refers to the point in time when it is first used in production for a 
commercial market, and in a similar way the adoption of an organisational innovation can be tied to the first use 
for commercial production (H. Rush, 1994, personal communication). However, a limited production for a market 
during a pilot test phase, does not necessarily mean that the organisational innovation is in any regular use within 
the firm. Rather, it could be argued that the subsequent diffusion to other departments could be considered as the 
starting point for the adoption of the innovation.  
70 Here user competence refers to both the ability to search for new opportunities and the ability to implement and 
manage change. The ability to search for new opportunities means the ability to find, to interpret, to understand, 
and to choose, in this case, an organisational innovation. The ability to implement and manage change means the 
ability to make the employees understand the need for change in the organisation, to set goals in the right 
direction, to organise the change process, to involve, motivate and mobilize the work force in the right direction, 
and finally to measure and keep track of the goals. 
71 'The literature on organisational innovation is vast and diverse. The studies focusing on invention, on the initial 
adoption decision or technology transfer among organisations are less relevant to understanding post adoption 
issues than is the research focused specifically on implementation.' (Leonard-Barton 1988, op. cit., Ref. 64). 
        
  
24
                                                                                                                                                                      
72 E.g. Spenley 1992, op. cit., Ref. 56. 
73 E.g. R. Beckhart & R. T. Harris, Organizational Transitions: Managing Complex Change, (Reading, MA, 
Addison-Wesley, 1977), and E. H. Schein, Organizational Culture and Leadership, (San Francisco, Jossey-Bass, 
1980). 
74 Teece 1980, op. cit., Ref. 48. 
75 For instance, the Volvo Uddevalla plant grew out of the long experience of Volvo factory in Kalmar. 
76 Parallel innovations can either be directly competitive in such a way that they perform almost the same function 
or are directed towards the same area, or indirectly competitive in such a way that they compete for the same 
limited resources in terms of money, managerial capacity, etc. 
77 In the case of the sequential form of diffusion, where one innovation is perceived by the individuals in an 
organisation as a direct continuation of an earlier failure,  major barriers are created. To overcome such barriers 
can be a matter of several years. 
78 Especially in the case of organisational and technical innovations there can be a direct synergistic condition. For 
example, the diffusion of new information technology in the form of distributed PC-based networks condition and 
positively enforce the diffusion of decentralized management practices in large corporations. 
79 Kimberley 1981, op. cit., Ref. 54. 
80 A. Berger, ‘Några spridda tankar kring organisatoriska innovationers uppkomst, spridning och adoption’, 
mimeo, Department of Industrial Management and Economics, Chalmers University of Technology, Göteborg, 
Sweden, 1993. 
81 G. D. R. Zaltman & J. Holbek, Innovations and Organisations, (New York, John Wiley & Sons, 1973), and J. 
R. Kimberley, 'Issues in the design of longitudinal organizational research',  Sociological Methods and Research, 
No: 4, 1976a, pp: 321-347, and Kimberley 1981, op. cit., Ref. 54. 
82 Organisational distance is here defined as the distance between the old and the new way of working. That is, 
differences in working routines, organisation, ways of communication etc. 
83 On the other hand, because of the tacitness of organisational innovations it may well be that potential adopters 
cannot easily distinguish between organisational practices that are closer to each other, which either can result in 
the rejection of a new organisational innovation on the grounds that it already has been implemented, or the result 
can be the adoption of certain new concepts while no real change in practice take place. 
84 Teece 1980, op. cit., Ref. 48. 
85 ibid. 
86  This has been done through committee work on what constitutes the Japanese TQC (JUSE 1987) and it is being 
enforced through the requirements for the Deming Prize, which is the Japanese quality award given to the 
company that best fullfil the TQC requirements.  (See JUSE, 'Features of Company-Wide Quality Control in 
Japan', by T. Ikezawa, Y. Kondo, A.Harada & T. Yoneyama, Proceedings form the International Conference on 
Quality Control (ICQC) in Tokyo 1987, pp.43-47. 
87  Carlsson & Jacobsson 1991, op. cit., Ref. 29. 
88  V. Mahajan, S. Sharma & R. D. Bettis, 'The Adoption of the M-form Organisational Structure: A Test of 
Imitation Hypothesis', Management Science, Vol.34, No.10, 1988, pp. 1188-1201. 
89  There are cases when adoption is done before a real profit crisis. Often then, a strong institutional structure 
exist or other external factors such as influential customers requiring a change, which for a small supplier firm can 
be perceived as close to a crisis. The adoption can also take place because of a 'bandwagon or demonstration 
effect' set in motion by leading companies (see e.g. K. Bemowiski, 'The Benchmarking Bandwagon', Quality 
Progress, January 1991.  
90 J. P. Womack, D. T. Jones & D., 'The Machine that Changed the World, (New York, Macmillan Publishing 
Company, 1990). 
91 One point in case is the Swedish Saab Automobile plant, which after a severe crisis has rapidly adopted the 
principles of 'lean production' and incorporated Japanese managerial experiences and methods into its production 
plant in Trollhättan.  
92  This may be one contributing factor to Kimberley's proposition that '..certain managerial innovations are likely 
to diffuse counter-cyclically.'.....As total income increases, consumption of technological innovations increases, 
whereas consumption of certain managerial innovations does not. As total income shrinks, however, consumption 
of these managerial innovations is likely to increase.' (Kimberley 1981, op. cit., Ref. 54, p.94) 
93  Mahajan et al. 1988, op. cit., Ref. 88. 
94  For many reasons dealt with in this paper, firm specific knowledge in organisation can be more sustainable than 
technological knowledge. 
95  Government policy may be conceived of as one corrective mechanism. For a review of some innovative 
technology transfer policies, see Bessant & Rush 1994. 
96  Kimberley 1981, op. cit., Ref. 54. 
        
  
25
                                                                                                                                                                      
97  The dual network structure consists of a tight local network complemented by a weak-ties network out into a 
diversified world. 
98  M. M. McKinney, A. D. Kaluzny & H. S. Zuckerman, 'Paths and Pacemakers; Innovation Diffusion Networks 
in Multihospital Systems and Alliances', Health Care Management Review, Vol. 16, 1991, pp. 17- 23. 
99 However, 'the imitation pattern' does not always seem to be the way that organisational innovations diffuse. In a 
meta-study of the diffusion of the M-form, i.e. a complex administrative innovation, Mahajan et al. (1988, op. cit., 
Ref. 88) found that '.. unlike the adoption of technological innovations, complex administrative innovations may 
not follow the imitation process'. Mahajan et al. provided three major reasons for this result: 'To sum, ... the 
uncertainty associated with the performance advantages of the M-form structure, the unique nature of the 
innovation itself and organisational momentum may be some of the reasons causing the adoption of the M-form 
structure not to follow the imitation process.' (our emphasis). 
100  Shiba 1987, personal communication. 
101 In addition, the consultants (the 'supplier industry' of organisational innovations) sell a packaged product which 
undergoes a continuous learning cycle each time it is implemented in a new organisational setting. 
102  One instrument on these lists is the use of systematic benchmarking techniques, i.e. to compare processes with 
best practice in industry in general, not only in the own industry, in order to avoid not-invented-here biases and 
increase the speed of the diffusion of organisational innovations.  
103 In Japan, this practice of transferring people and hence, their tacit knowledge, is well developed. One example 
is the practice of letting a development engineer follow the product downstream. Another example is the habit of 
moving people that are getting close to retirement age to a supplier firm (S. Alänge, O. Granstrand & S. Sjölander, 
'Some Preliminary Impressions from Japan', CIM Working paper, No. WP 1988-06. 
104 Political and legal constraints can facilitate the diffusion process (Kimberley 1981, op. cit., Ref. 54). One clear 
example of this is the rapid diffusion of ISO 9000 certification in the UK, which mainly can be explained by the 
Thatcher government's decision to require all suppliers to the state to have a ISO 9000 certificate by a certain date. 
The result was that all firms considering involving themselves in government procurement activities rushed to get 
a certificate. Adoption of a new technology does not, of course, automatically lead to successful implementation. 
